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ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS HEARING
REQUIREMENTS AND THE FEDERAL
MARITIME COMMISSION
GEORGE H. HEARN*
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has contributed much to the field of administrative law. In
a very recent case, Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC,1 that
court dealt with the constitutional principle of due process as it
applies to the holding of hearings before administrative agencies.
Specifically, the court considered the question of when a hearing
must be held in certain cases before the Federal Maritime
Commission and what type of hearing suffices in law. The
importance of these issues generally, and particularly to the Federal
Maritime Commission, indicates that an analysis of the issues
considered by the court is needed at this time.
I
In Marine Space Enclosures the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Federal Maritime Commission acted
contrary to law when it failed to hold a hearing before approving
two agreements presented to it for approval.2 The agreements
provided for the construction and maintenance of consolidated
marine passenger terminal facilities in the port of New York City-
and for the use of the facilities by passenger vessel operatorsO Under
the Shipping Act of 1916,1 approval of such agreements by the
Federal Maritime Commission is required before they may be
* Member, Federal Maritime Commission. B.A. 1950, St. Francis College (Brooklyn);
LL.B. 1954, St. John's University; Member, New York State Bar; Lecturer, American
University School of Law; Federal Maritime Commission Representative in the
Administrative Conference. The writer wishes to express his appreciation for the assistance of
Eliot J. Halperin, his Special Assistant, Member, New York State Bar.
1. 420 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
2. Id.
3. FMC Agreements Nos. T-2271 & T-2272, FMC Docket No. 69-47 (T-2271 dated Jan.
17, 1969; T-2272 dated Jan. 15, 1969; both filed Feb. 20, 1969). The first agreement is a
passenger terminal lease between the City of New York and the Port of New York Authority
and an agreement to construct new marine passenger facilities in the City. The second
agreement is between the City of New York, the Port of New York Authority, and passenger
vessel operators and provides for use of the new facilities and certain interim facilities pending
completion of the new terminal.
4. 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1964).
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implemented, 5 and these had been filed for approval in February
1969. The agreements were then noticed in the Federal Register,, and
at the request of the Port Authority and the Mayor of New York
City the usual twenty-day notice period was shortened to twelve
days.7 A protest against approval of the agreements was received
from Marine Space Enclosures, Inc., and was concurred in by its
affiliate, the American Dock Company of Staten Island, New York.
Other comments were received urging immediate approval of the
agreements as being in the public interest!
The protests, and subsequently the court proceeding, focused on
several restrictive covenants contained in the agreements. It is
provided in the first agreement that the City and the Port Authority
will not
promote, finance, establish, construct, operate, or maintain any pier, wharf,
bulkhead, flock, terminal or other facilities for the accommodation of
passenger vessels, or authorize any other person so to do [for a term] no more
than fifty years after the expiration of the original term of the letting of the
permanent premises.9
The original term is 23 years-3 years for the interim terminal and
20 years for amortization of a bond issue for financing the project.
Thus the total term after completion of the new terminal would be
70 years.10
A related restriction provides that "neither the City nor the Port
Authority will issue any work permit or other construction approval
or consent whereby structures suitable for [passenger terminal]
operations may be provided . . . anywhere within the jurisdiction of
the City or Port Authority.""1
The chief protestant, Marine Space Enclosures, Inc., stated that
5. Id. § 814.
6. 34 Fed. Reg. 3639 (1969).
7. The twenty-day period is not provided for by rule or statute, but has been traditionally
granted by the Commission. But see 46 C.F.R. § 529.21 (1969).
8. New York Chamber of Commerce; New York City Council on Port Development and
Promotion; Cunard Steam-Ship Company, Ltd.; French Line; International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, AFL-CIO.
9. 420 F.2d at 580-81.
10. Id. at 581.
11. Id. at 581 n.3. By a combination of provisions in the two agreements, it is further pro-
vided that vessel operators serving the Port of New York shall not operate at any terminal
facility other than the one to be constructed. Under the second agreement all passenger vessel
operators may become signatories to the agreements, and no such operator may use the new
terminal without becoming a signatory. These restrictions are coextensive with the 70 year
term of the first agreement.
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it is interested in constructing and operating a terminal facility
different than the one proposed in the agreements and that because
of the anticompetitive covenants in the agreements, the protestant
would be barred from establishing its terminal. 2 Protestant argued
that the anticompetitive provisions were prima facie contrary to the
public interest standard of applicable law and that the agreements
should be disapproved or subjected to an "evidentiary" hearing.
The City and the Port Authority responded to the protests,
stating that the agreements had been the subject of public hearings
before the New York City Council and had been approved by the
Board of Estimate of the City of New York without opposition. 3
The Marine Space terminal proposal had been presented in the
hearings and rejected. It was further contended that a hearing before
the Federal Maritime Commission would cause financially harmful
delay and that the restrictive provisions did not preclude operation
of terminal facilities in the Port of New York other than the
proposed terminal. 4 In addition the response noted that no vessel
operators had formally intervened or protested before the
Commission." The City and Port Authority represented to the
Commission that the new facilities would have to be financed by
public funds, and that a $60,000,000 bond issue was contemplated;
and during preliminary discussions the Commission was told that
such funds could not be obtained withoit the long term exclusive
commitments contained in the agreements."
The Commission received further submissions from the
proponents and protestants of the agreements. They related to
alleged coercion by the Port Authority to get several carriers to sign
the agreements. The protestants contended that although no protests
had been received, the carriers harbored reservations as to the
agreements. Although the agreements contain spaces for eighteen
carriers' signatures, only six had signed as of the date of the court
of appeals decision. 7
On April 7, 1969, the Commission issued its Order of Approval.
The Commission found that "Proponents have demonstrated a
12. Id. at 581.
13. Id. at 582.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See also Supplementary Response of the Port of New York Authority, Agreements
Nos. T-2271 & T-2272, at I I & 13 (Mar. 21, 1969).
17. 420 F.2d at 582.
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transportation need for the agreements and it would appear that the
agreements are not unjustly discriminatory or unfair or detrimental
to the commerce of the United States and are not contrary to the
public interest.""8 Further, the Commission concluded that "the
transportation need is so clear we consider it essential that the
project be permitted to be initiated as soon as possible."' 9 The
protests were rejected by the Commission on the grounds that "the
proposals of protestant were rejected by officials of the City of New
York"2 0 and the protestants' interests appear "indirect and
remote."2 1
As to the anticompetitive provisions of the agreements, the
Commission acknowledged their restrictive nature:
Under Section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, the Commission retains full
power of surveillance over approved agreements as a condition of approval.
The Commission, after approval, retains the power to "cancel or modify any
agreement, or any modification ...thereof, whether or not previously
approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair . . . or
to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be
contrary to the public interest, or to be in violation of [the Shipping Act,
19161. . ...n
Subsequent to the Commission's approval, seven carriers
requested the Commission to meet with them for informal
discussions concerning the agreements. Later, a group of seven
carriers moved for and was granted leave tol intervene in the court
of appealsP
On May 12, 1969, the Commission issued its Supplement to
Order of Approval, which discussed a "Stipulation of Proponents"
submitted to the Commission on May 8, a month after the original
order of approval! 4 By that document the City and Port Authority,
"at the suggestion of the Department of Justice [agreed] to resubmit
the agreements for Commission review at least six months prior to
the termination of the original lease term of 23 years." 1 The
Commission affirmed its prior approval and added that
[i]n view of thisstipulation the Commission will at that point [at the end of
18. FMC Order of Approval, Agreements Nos. T-2271 & T-2272, at 3-4 (April 7, 1969).
19. Id. at 6
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id. at 4.
22. Id. at 6-7.
23. 420 F.2d at 582.
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23 years] review the agreements in light of current circumstances and decide
anew whether any continued anticompetitive agreements would be in the
public interest. This, we believe, will insure the protection of the public
interest. . ..
Further, the supplemental order noted the request of seven carriers
for informal discussions with the Commission, but stated thiat the
carriers had not desired to submit a formal protest.7
II
The immediate effect of the circuit court's decision to remand the
case to the Commission for a hearing is not the most significant
aspect of the case. Of course, implementation of the agreements has
been delayed, and the proponents have since requested the
Commission to hold a public hearing on the agr.eemrents!8 In fact,
it is difficult to find fault with the result reached by the court?' What
is debatable, however, is how the court reached its conclusion. That
is the significant aspect of the case. The court said that not only is
a hearing prior to approval of the agreements required in this case,
but a hearing is statutorily mandated before any agreement may be
approved.0
To appreciate the significance of this statement it is necessary
first to understand the statutory scheme involved. Section 15 of the
Shipping Act, 1916 provides, inter alia:
The Commission shall by order, after notice and hearing, disapprove,
cancel or modify any agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof,
whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly
discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers,
or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign
competitiors, or to operate to the detriment of the Commerce of the United
States, or to be contrary to the public interest, or to be in violation of this
Act, and shall approve all other agreements, modifications, or cancellations.3 '
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. at 1.
28. Such a hearing was instituted by Commission order of September 12, 1969. 34 Fed.
Reg. 14485, 14486 (1969).
29. During Commission deliberation on the two agreements, certain reservations were
expressed as to their restrictive provisions. I expressed my concern by motions for hearings
on the agreements which failed to carry. Federal Maritime Commission, Minutes of
Commission Meetings, April 4, 1969. Ultirately, however, the Commission concluded that
its fears would be arrested by the terms of its Order of Approval. Id., April 4 & 7, 1969.
Subsequently, I voted against Commission issuance of the Supplement to Order of Approval
because I considered a hearing on the agreements necessary. Id., May 12, 1969.
30. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
31. 46 U.S&C. § 814 (1964) (emphasis added).
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In interpreting this provision and in commencing its reasoning, the
court said:
A quick and over-literal reading of § 15 might generate the notion that
a hearing is required only if the Commission disapproves an agreement and
not if the Commission merely grants approval . . . .What the words
of § 15 fairly indicate is that an appropriate hearing shall be held prior to
either approval or disapprovaI
The importance of Commission approval of section 15
agreements is stated in the Shipping Act as follows:
Any agreement and any modification or cancellation of any agreement
not approved, or disapproved, by the Commission shall be unlawful, and
agreements, modifications, and cancellations shall be lawful only when and
as long as approved by the Commission; before approval or after disapproval
it shall be unlawful to carry out in whole or in part, directly or indirectly,
any such agreement, modification, or cancellation ...
Every agreement, modification, or cancellation lawful under this section,
or permitted under section 813a of this title, shall be excepted from the
provisions of sections 1-11 and 15 of Title 15, and amendments and acts
supplementary thereto.
Thus, agreements not approved are unlawful and may not be
implemented but once approved are immune from the anti-trust
laws.
The court's conclusion, however, was not that an evidentiary
type hearing is always required-only a "hearing." The type of
hearing required, the court indicated, may depend upon the issues
involved in the particular case3 Nevertheless, it appears from all the
surrounding circumstances that the court's interpretation of the
hearing requirement is at least unnecessary and certainly open to
question. First, it should be noted that the court, after stating the
pre-approval hearing requirement, allowed for certain exceptions.
According to the court a hearing is not required: (1) "when the
Commission has made appropriate determination that certain
agreements are of purely routine nature or (2) have an impact on
commerce that the Commission finds is de minimis";as (3) "if no
32. 420 F.2d at 583-84 (emphasis added); cf. City of Los Angeles v. FMC, 388 F.2d
582, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
33. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964) (emphasis added). The sections of 15 U.S.C. referred to include
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964); Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11
(1964); Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
34. 420 F.2d at 585 n.22, 586, 589-90 & n.36.
35. Id. at 584.
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protest is filed;" 3' (4) if there are no issues of "substance" or
"obvious gravity";3 7 6r (5) when "an applicant for approval of a
restrictive agreement. [satisfies] the burden of demonstrating the need
for anticompetitive restraints . . "38 In the presence of such ex-
cepted situations, however, exception number three seems to be
overriding. If a protest is filed it appears that the court would apply
its general rule requiring a hearing unless "no substantial issues are
raised"'" by the protest.
The first two of these exceptions-routine and de minimis
agreements-were designated "implied exceptions" 40 by the court,
but the court's discussion of this point seems somewhat.uncertain.
The so-called "exceptions" can and do exist with or without the
general hearing rule stated by the court.
Exceptions one and two are applicable, the court indicated, only
when they have been created at a previous time for general
application. Thus, the court said:
There may be an implied exception to the literal command of Section 15
when the Commission has made appropriate determination ....
However, the matter before us is not appropriate for establishing any
implied exception to section 15. To begin with, there is no Commission rule
announcing an exemption for the agreements involved?
For this statement the court cited section 35 of the Shipping
Act-added to the Act in 1966-which provides that the
Commission "may by order or rule exempt for the future any class of
agreements .. . from any requirement of the Shipping Act, 1916
where it finds that such exemption will not substantially impair
effective regulation . . . be unjustly discriminatory, or be detrimen-
tal to commerce. '4 2
From the court's discussion of routine and de minimis
agreements (implied exceptions) and of section 35 agreements
(exemptions) together, it appears the court included the former in the
latter. Since, however, the Congress has enacted a special section
permitting exemptions which would include routine and de minimis
36. Id. at 587 n.27.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 583.
39. Id. at 586-87 & n.27.
40. Id. at 584.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. 80 Stat. 1358 (1966) (emphasis added).
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agreements, there is no need for establishing a separate category of
"implied exceptions" as did the court. This confusion is avoided,
however, by concluding that the exceptions and exemptions are two.
separate categories of agreements, a conclusion compelled by several
factors.
In the first place, agreements which are exempted under section
35 do not receive antitrust immunity. Only agreements which are
approved can obtain immunity, and the Commission, in the most
recent case in which an agreement exemption has been granted,
specifically denied a request by a party for a Commission statement
to the effect that exempted agreements are immune 3 Exceptions are
entirely different. The court seems to have used the term to mean
agreements for which no hearing must be held prior to their
approval. Agreements exempted from the filing for approval
requirements of the Shipping Act are relieved of the need to get
approval to begin with, and such agreements, therefore, are not
subject to the prohibition against, implementing unapproved
agreements and the attendant penalty provision." Consequently, the
category of exempted agreements should not enter into a discussion
of section 15 approval. Furthermore, there is an internal
Commission system of "delegation" for the expeditious approval of
agreements of the type the court called "implied exceptions." Under
this system the Commission has delegated to members of its staff
the authority to approve certain unprotested agreements and
modifications or cancellations thereof. 5
An interesting point here is that the "exceptions" almost equal
the "rule." Between March 1 and November 30, 1969, the
Commission approved 167 agreements or modifications subject to
section 15. Of these, 87 (52 percent) were approved under delegated
43. FMC General Order 23 (Mai 13, 1968), 46 C.F.R. §§ 524.1-.6 (1969). In the only
other such exemption created to date the Commission stated that no immunity attaches to
exempted agreements. FMC General Order 4, amend. 11 (April 21, 1967), 46
C.F.R. § 510.26(b)(1969).
44. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. Anyone violating § 15 is subject to a penalty
of up to $1,000 a day. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
45. The basis for the establishment of this system of delegation is in Reorganization Plan
No. 7 of 1961 whereby the Federal Maritime Commission was established as an independent
regulatory agency-an arm of the Congress. 5 U.S.C. § 133z.5 note (1964). Reorganization
Plan No. 7, § 105, authorizes the Commission to delegati any of its functions; and this
authority has been exercised in Commission Order I (Revised) and Amendments 3 & 4
(denoted in Federal Register as Amendments 2 & 3), 34 Fed. Reg. 2278 (1969); 33 Fed. Reg.
11863 (1968); 31 Fed. Reg. 15110 (1966).
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authority, and 12 (7.2 percent) were subjected to a hearing. Of the
agreements approved by delegation, none was later reviewed by the
Commission and set down for a hearing.
Thus, by congressional permission, the FMC is empowered to
exempt entirely some agreements from the approval requirements
and to approve other agreements by delegation in a manner which
precludes the holding of a hearing." Consequently, less than a
majority of agreements-80, or 48 percent of those approved-may
exhibit a prima facie need for a hearing; that is, are not permitted
to be approved under delegated authority. Then again these
agreements are also amenable to exceptions according to the court,
but not the implied exceptions. When these other exceptions-
numbers 3, 4 and 5, supra-are applied to the March-November.
1969 period, records of the FMC reveal that only 15 percent of thc
80 agreements not covered by delegation-by the implied excep.
tions-were actually set down for a hearing.47
It appears, therefore, that the requirement stated by the court
that all section 15 agreements be set down for hearing prior to
approval is really the exception to the rule of experience. As a result,
what emerges is an outline of Commission procedure consistent with
that set forth by the court. The significant difference is the starting
point for the procedures. Whereas the court proceeded from the
requirement of a pre-approval hearing which can be avoided only
when certain exceptions apply, the Commission has acted under the
assumption that no hearing is required, and that wherever possible
agreements should be processed for approval without a hearing. In
this connection the court made a pertinent comment. The court
found it "hard to believe" that a hearing is required for disapproval
of an agreement, but that the Commission could confer approval
"on the basis of back-office and one-sided conversations, and
unpublished disposition unaccompanied by reasoned analysis and
opportunity for appropriate presentation of objection, evidence and
argument."" This statement could be given more than one
46. It should be noted, however, that parties to a type of agreement for which an exemption
has been granted can still obtain approval of such agreement, 46 C.F.R. 524.6 (1969), and,
also, approvals granted under delegated authority are subject to review by the Commission.
Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961, § 105(b), 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15 note (1964).
47. These figures are from the files of the Federal Maritime Commission. The March I-
November 30, 1969 period is the only recent period for which complete statistics on this
subject are available at the time of this writing.
48. 420 F.2d at 584.
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interpretation. It could mean that improper ex parte activity must
not be engaged in so as to deprive a protestant raising substantial
issues of his right to have them properly and fairly aired and.
considered. With this there can be no disagreement. However, the
court's comment seems rather to be used as an argument in support
of the conclusion that pre-approval hearings are required. In this
respect the argument is not realistic when viewed in light of
Commission experience.
Of the 167 agreements approved by the Commission in the
March-November period, 155 were approved without a hearing.
Commission experience with such approvals reveals that only in very
rare instances is approval granted to agreements in the form in
which they are first submitted. Generally there is some give and take
between agreement proponents, protestants, if any, and the
Commission. Even in the absence of protests the Commission is
rarely satisfied with agreements as submitted and usually requests
the parties to make modifications!' The parties are often advised
that failure to make the requested modifications will result in the
Commission ordering the proposed agreement set down for a
hearing.
When protests, or comments, are filed pursuant to Federal
Register notice, the Commission gives proponents an opportunity to
respond to them, and an attempt is made to satisfy the protestants
to the extent their points are meritorious. In the great majority of
instances protestants are ultimately satisfied and their protests
withdrawn. It sometimes happens, however, that protestants are
either unsatisfied or unwilling to withdraw their protests, but the
Commission nevertheless grants approval without a hearing. When
such action is taken, the Commission order of approval summarizes
the protests and gives reasons for not accepting them. There is not
recallable an instance-at least prior to Marine Space
Enclosures-in which a protestant has sought reconsideration or
review of any such approval through available means. 0
Despite the fact that this modus operandi may sometimes involve
"back-office and one-sided conversations,"'" the result is not a
failure to afford due process. In fact, the Commission's procedure
49. Certain items are required to be included in agreements. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
50. Possible avenues to review are Shipping Act, 19f6, § 22, 46 U.S.C. § 81 (1964), and
28 U.S.C. §§ 2342-43 (Supp. IV, 1969).
51. 420 F.2d at 584.
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promotes due process by encouraging what in other forums is
actively sought and desired -out of "court" settlements. Proponents
of agreements can have them approved without the delay which
would be occasioned by any type of hearing, the Commission's
docket can be kept as uncrowded as possible, and, generally, the
public interest is served by the prompt initiation and improvement
of shipping services. The avoidance of hearings should be the goal
so long as these benefits are not outweighed by possible detriment
to any interested party or the public interest, and the procedures
followed by the Commission should not be undone so long as the
evidence indicates that the public interest is being promoted-or at
least not offended-and no denial of due process is involved.
III
The question of whether or not the court's pre-approval hearing
requirement is necessary or desirable is avoided if it is
demonstrable that such a hearing is statutorily required. This, in
fact, is the basis upon which the court founded its conclusions:
We think the mandate of Congress was violated when the Commission
failed to hold a hearing ....
... What the words of § 15 fairly indicate is that an appropriate
hearing shall be held prior to either approval or disapproval"
The court found support for this conclusion in the case of FMC
v. Svenska Amerika Linien, in which the Supreme Court affirmed
a decision of the Commission and approved its placing on an
applicant for approval the burden of justifying the need for the
particular anti-competitive restraints. This is not, however, a
sufficient basis for finding a Congressional intent to require a pre-
approval hearing. Justification can be presented in a variety of ways
including procedures which dispense with a hearing. If, for example,
no protests or comments are filed with respect to a proposed
agreement, even the court in Marine Space Enclosures might allow
approval without a hearing. Furthermore, a dialogue between the
Commission and proponents of. an agreement can often result in
rendering the agreement approvable, and this is the procedure
usually followed by the Commission in an attempt to avoid undue
52. Id. at 582, 584 (emphasis added).
53. 390 U.S. 238 (1968).
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delay. 4 Such action is supported by the recent'case of Sea-Land
Service, Inc. v. Conner, 5 cited by the court in Marine Space
Enclosures: "[[In an appropriate case, the [Maritime Subsidy]
Board may dispense with a hearing and support its procedural
course, by virtue of meaningful findings, based on its expertise in
appraising materials in its open files ....
This is not to say, however, that it would be permissible in all
cases for the Commission to approve, without a hearing, agreements
which are unprotested and with respect to which the Commission has
satisfied itself as to prima facie approvability through contacts with
proponents. There are times when an airing of issues through briefs
or other submissions will be helpful in demonstrating a need for
particularly anticompetitive restraints,57 and the FMC has a Bureau
of Hearing Counsel through which the public interest is actively
represented by attorneys in cases before the Commission.
Furthermore, there are some cases in which due process requires a
hearing regardless of statutory provisions l
It is not here contended that the Commission must act only in
response to protests: "In discharging our duties under section 15, we
are not limited to those matters parties to agreements wish us to see.
We are required to go further . . . . To decide otherwise [would be]
at the expense of our regulatory responsibility."'" The Commission
has a statutory obligation to guard the public interest independent
of the interests of private parties.e"
The intent of Congress is better sought by examining the
legislative history of section 15, and the first thing to be noted is that
a hearing requirement was not provided for in that section in the
original Shipping Act of 1916.11 Not until 1961 did Congress amend
54. See notes 49-50supra and accompanying text.
55. 418 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
56. Id. at 1149.
57. See, e.g., FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968).
58. See, e.g., L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
59. Agreement No. T-4: Terminal Lease Agreement at Long Beach, California, 8 F.M.C.
521, 529 (1965).
60. See Investigation of Passenger Steamship Conferences Regarding Travel Agents, 10
F.M.C. 27 (1966). "Section 15's authorization of agreements . . . does not dictate approval
simply because such an agreement is filed and approval is desired by the parties to the
agreement." Id. at 34. For the writer's previously stated views concurring on this point, see
his separate opinion in Merger-American Mail Line, American President Lines, Pacific Far
East Line, I I F.M.C. 53, 72 (1967). See also Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FPC, 383 F.2d
204 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 913 (1960).
61. Ch. 451, 39 Stat. 733.
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the Act to provide for a hearing!2 However, Congress made several
amendments to the Shipping Act at that time, the most notable
being that which permitted exclusive patronage-dual
rate-contracts in our foreign waterborne commerce,63 and,
consequently, the bulk of the legislative history deals with that
amendment and not too niuch is to be gleaned as to hearing
requirements. Nevertheless, there are indications as to what was
intended by the 1961 changes in section 15.
Section 15 originally read, in pertinent part: "The board may by
order disapprove . . . and shall approve all other agreements,
modifications, or cancellations."'" The amendment process began
with the introduction in the House of Representatives of H.R. 4299
on February 15, 1961, which provided: "The Board shall by order
after notice and hearing disapprove. . . and shall approve all other
agreements, modifications, or cancellations that it affirmatively
finds to be in the public interest."65 Thereafter, extensive
congressional hearings were conducted, during various stages of
which modifications were made in the proposed amendment to
section 15. No apparent objections were made to the amendment
providing for notice and hearing before disapproval. There were,
however, comments directed against the requirement that approval
be based upon an affirmative finding that an agreement is in the
public interest.
One witness"6 before a special subcommittee of the House of
Representatives Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries was
disturbed by some of the language of H.R. 4299. He contended that,
if left unchanged, the bill would add to the Shipping Act the
requirement that the Commission "give notice and hold a hearing
on every agreement . . . . It . . . [would require] the ...
[Commission] to disapprove any agreement which it does not
affirmatively find in the public interest." 7 The witness foresaw this
62. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
63. Shipping Act, 1916, § 14b, 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1964).
64. Ch. 451, 39 Stat. 734 (emphasis added).
65. H.R. 4299, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961); see Hearings on H.R. 4299 Before the Special
Subcomm. on Steamship Conferences of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
66. Donald F. Wierda, vice president of freight traffic of the United States Lines Co.,
appeared on behalf of the American Steamship Committee on Conference studies. House
Hearings 60.
67. Id. at 74.
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result in the requirement in the bill that the Commission make an
affirmative finding regarding the public interest prior to approval.
To avoid such a pervasive pre-approval hearing requirement and to
permit Commission approval without a hearing, the witness
recommended that the affirmative hearing requirement be deleted
from the bill."
Similarly-focused comments were made by Thomas E. Stakem,
then Chairman of the Federal Maritime Board,"' and the
Department of Commerce-which then housed the Federal Maritime
Board. In suggesting the deletion of the "affirmative finding"
requirement, Mr. Stakem said: "It is believed that all agreements
which satisfy those standards [which call for disapproval if offended]
should be approvable . . . without the need for a further affirmative
finding that the agreement is in furtherance of the public interest."70
The Department of Commerce commented as follows after
recommending the same deletion:
In conformity with other similar statutes . . . we believe that if a public
interest standard is to be applied . . .it should be phrased in terms of
permitting the approval of agreements . . . not [found] to be adverse to the
public interest. . . .Requiring a positive finding. . . would prevent carriers
from operating under arrangements which, although not meriting disapproval
...could not be shown to positively contribute to the public interest7
After these comments were received there appeared on March 23,
1961, a Committee Print of a revised form of H.R. 4299. That
version of the bill deleted the "affirmative finding" requirement and
reverted to the language of the original Act: "and shall approve all
other agreements, modifications, or cancellations. ' 3 This was
quickly undone, however, when draft revision No. 2 was published
by the subcommittee on April 13. That version read: "The Board
shall by order after notice and hearing disapprove ...and shall
68. Id. at 67.
69. The Federal Maritime Board was the predecessor of the Federal Maritime Commission.
Reorganization Plan No. 21 of 1950, 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15 note (1964).
70. House Hearings 25.
71. Id. at 7.
72. STAFF OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STEAMSHIP CONFERENCES OF THE HOUSE Comm.
ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES. 87TH CONG., IST SEss., H.R. 4299, DRAFT REVISION
No. I (Comm. Print 1961); see Office of General Counsel, Federal Maritime Commission,
Steamship Conference Dual Rate Law (P.L. 87-346), Legislative History (undated) (available
in FMC Library).
73. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
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approve all other agreements, modifications, or cancellations that it
finds not contrary to the public interest.""
During the intervening period a witness testified as being in favor
of retaining the need for an "affirmative finding": "The bill rightly
says, in effect, that the anti-trust laws shall not be set aside in the
absence of a definite need; if the Board cannot find such a need in
the given case it plainly ought not to grant the exemption." 75
Oddly, however, another comment of the same witness supported
a suggestion of the Department of Commerce, 76 which would have
eliminated the pre-approval hearing requirement. It was suggested
that the words "notice and hearing"-prior to disapproval-be
replaced by "publication and notice in the Federal Register and
affording to all interested parties an opportunity for hearing. ' 7 This
change, the Department of Commerce said, was to avoid a
construction of the bill which would "require a hearing in
connection with every agreement without regard to whether any
person having a bona fide interest requests a hearing. ' 78
Hearings were continued after publication of the April 13 draft
No. 2 and opposition continued to the "affirmative finding"
provision: "This requirement for an affirmative finding would seem
to mean that there could be no approval without some sort of
hearing to provide facts upon which this ultimate and vague finding
could be predicated. 79
On May 2, 1961, the subcommittee reported H.R. 4299, which
was introduced the next day as "clean bill" H.R. 6775; on May 4-
the full House committee ordered H.R. 6775 reported; on June 12
the bill passed the House-all without further pertinent amendment
of the April 13 draft80
The Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Commerce commenced hearings on the subject on
74. STAFF OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STEAMSHIP CONFERENCES OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., H.R. 4299, DRAFT REVISION
No. 2 (1961) (emphasis added); see MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES SUBCOMM. OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, INDEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STEAMSHIP
CONFERENCE/DUAL RATE LAW, S. Doc. No. 100, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1962) [herein-
after cited as DUAL RATE LAW INDEX]; House Hearings 539-40.
75. House Hearings 418.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 7.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 510.
80. DUAL RATE LAW INDEX 28.
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June 16. On August 8 the subcommittee released its version of the
bill, which departed from the House-passed bill by deleting all
reference to an affirmative finding prior to approval of an
agreement 1 During the Senate hearings the most relevant comment
relating to that part of the bill concluded:
This short phrase ["that it finds not contrary to the public interest"] means
that the Board would be required to have a hearing on every agreement filed
with it for approval under section 15 since the term "finds" legally imports
a public hearing.
This ...requirement ...would immesh the Federal Maritime Board
and parties subject to the act in interminable litigation that would make all
of section 15 unworkable.P
The bill as printed by the subcommittee on August 8 proceeded
without pertinent change when reported by the Senate Committee on
August 31 and passed by the Senate on September 12.P Congress,
on taking final action, accepted the Senate version.
It seems significant that all attempts to amend section 15 to
require specific findings prior to approval-as required before
disapproval-met with failure. The argument might be made,
however, that Commission and court cases which place the burden
on proponents of agreements to "demonstrate that the agreement is
required by a serious transportation need"8 have negated any
possible significance of the failure to enact those amendments.p This
position is, however, questionable. Although a burden has been
shifted to the proponents of an agreement, the proponent of an
order-in this case an order of approval-usually has the burden of
proofs' All that is shifted is the burden of going forward with the
evidence. Thus, in cases where proponents of an agreement are
required to justify its need, there is already a prima facie case against
81. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON COMMERCE, 87TH CONG., IST SESs. H.R. 6775 (Subcomm. Print 1961); see Hearings on
H.R. 6775 Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Mariie and Fisheries of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 607 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings].
82. Senate Hearings 243.
83. DUAL RATE LAW INDEX 28.
84. Investigation of Passenger Steamship Conferences Regarding Travel Agents, 10 F.M.C.
27, 34-35 (1966); see. e.g., FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968);
Mediterranean Pools Investigation, 9 F.M.C. 264 (1966).
85. See Brief for Petitioners, Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC, 420 F.2d 577 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
86. Federal Maritime Commission, Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 10(o), 46
C.F.R. § 502.155 (1969).
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approval which the proponents must overcome. This holds whether
the prima facie case is established by the Commission's investigation
of the agreement on its own motion or by a protestant. Inasmuch
as an agreement cannot be disapproved without a hearing, a hearing
is always required in cases where there is a prima facie case
warranting disapproval.
Consequently, when the Commission institutes a hearing to
determine whether a proposed agreement should be approved or
disapproved, it is for the purpose of giving the agreement's
proponents an opportunity to overcome the prima facie case for
disapproval. Before the hearing is concluded it cannot be known
whether the proponents will be able to meet their burden, and,
therefore, the hearing must be held in order for the Commission to
be permitted to disapprove the agreement if the prima facie case for
disapproval is not overcome. The argument is, therefore, not
supported that a shifting of the "burden" to agreement proponents
is evidence of a pre-approval hearing requirement.
Thus, the court's conclusion that hearings are always required
prior to approval appears entirely unnecessary because in a prima
facie case requiring disapproval, a hearing is required by the terms
of section 15; if there is no such case, the legislative history, as we
have thus far discussed, fairly indicates that there was no
congressional intent to require a hearing before every approval.
Furthermore, there is no additional evidence, either in the legislative
history or elsewhere, to lead one to a different conclusion. The little
remaining evidence, 7 is somewhat tangential but tends to add
support to the conclusion that there is no mandated pre-approval
hearing requirement.
First, there is Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States,"8 a case cited in
the legislative history8 and by other forums" for the proposition,
inter alia, that the Commission must hold a hearing prior to
approving agreements under section 15. Nevertheless, the language
of the decision in Isbrandtsen demonstrates that the court did not
so hold." There the Commission's predecessor agency had before it
a steamship conference agreement to institute an exclusive
87. See notes 88-101 infra and accompanying text.
88. 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954).
89. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 860, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 8-9 (1961); 107 CONG. REC. 19410
(1961).
90. FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481,486 & n.7 (1958).
91. The Isbrandsen case was not cited by the court in Marine Space Enclosures.
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patronage-or dual rate-contract system." The agency ordered a
hearing on the contract but permitted it to go into effect
immediately. The complainant filed its petition in the court of
appeals to review the Board's having permitted it to become effective
prior to a hearing. The court set aside the Board's action, but the
plain meaning of the court's language indicates only that the Board
had not approved the system as required by section 15. This is
revealed in the following excerpts from the court's opinion:
Clearly, a scheme of dual rates like that involved here is an "agreement"
.... It can hardly be classified an interstitial sort of adjustment. . . .But
even if it were not a new agreement, it would certainly be classed as a
"modification" of the existing basic agreement. In either case, § 15 requires
that such agreements or modifications "shall be lawful only when and as long
as approved" by the Board.P Until such approval is obtained, the Shipping
Act makes it illegal to institute the dual rate system 3
"We understand the Board to agree that if the dual rate agreement here
requires Board approval under § 15, the agreement could not be validated
by the General Order 76 procedure prior to such approval ...
We hold that the action of the Board in allowing the dual rate system
agreement to go into effect prior to approval. . is contrary to the specific
requirement of § 15 of the Shipping Act making Board approval a necessary
condition precedent to initiation of such an agreement.u
This language cannot fairly be read to mean that the cqurt
interpreted section 15 to require a pre-approval hearing.
Consequently, reliance on the case in the legislative history for that
proposition is misplaced. Even so, the case was relied upon, and it
is worth examining at least one example of that apparent
misreliance. Whether or not the interpretation of Isbrandtsen was
accurate, the meaning placed on the case may reveal something of
the congressional intent.
The most pertinent citation of Isbrandtsen appears not in any
discussion of section 15 but, strangely, in a discussion of the
provision in H.R. 6775 which authorized the type of exclusive
patronage contracts at issue in Isbrandtsen. It is important to note
that Isbrandtsen dealt only with section 15; there was no provision
then in the Shipping Act dealing with exclusive patronage contracts.
92. 211 F.2d at 53.
93. Id. at 56. See the exception to the approval requirement in the fourth paragraph of
section 15,46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
94. 211 F.2d at 57 (emphasis added).
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References were made to the case in the legislative history only for
the purpose of buttressing arguments for adoption of the exclusive
patronage provision of the proposed legislation. 5
During the Senate floor debate on the exclusive patronage
provision of H.R. 6775, now section 14b of the Shipping Act,"
Senator Kefauver invoked the Isbrandtsen case in support of his
proposed amendment to that provision but not in regard to any
aspect of section 15.Y In view of the fact that Senator Kefauver was
evidently concerned only with section 14b and that Isbrandisen was
being misinterpreted as to section 15, it cannot be said that there was
an intent in Congress to tamper with what appears to have been the
then determined amended meaning of section 15-that a hearing is
required prior to disapproval but not approval. This is illustrated by
Senator Kefauver's comments in support of the amendment.18
The language of H.R. 6775 and Senator Kefauver's amendment
was: "[T]he [Federal Maritime] Board . . . shall, after notice, [and
hearing] permit the use. . . of any contract. ... "12
In support of this amendment, the Senator said:
Mr. President, everywhere else in the bill it is provided that where some
action is to be taken by the Maritime Commission, both notification and
hearing shall be given ....
As the bill is presented, it provides that after the notice, the Commission
may agree to a conference [read: may approve an exclusive patronage
contract]. It does not say anything about giving anyone a hearing in
connection with the questions involved. The amendment would simply insert
hearing after the word notice...
The Senator's comments on the need to provide a hearing if notice
is given, together with the circumstances surrounding the failure to
amend the approval aspect of section 15, lead to the conclusion that
he was merely conforming language. In other words, Senator
Kefauver was referring to the notice and hearing in section 15 only
insofar as it was applicable-to. disapprovals. Although this bit of
Senate debate is not firm evidence upon which to base a conclusion
that there is no mandated pre-approval hearing, neither does it
95. See S. REP. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1961).
96. 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1964).
97. 107 CONG. REC. 19410 (1961). The Congressional Record erroneously designated the
amendment as "6-1-61-0" instead of "9-1-61-0."
98. Id.
99. Senate Hearings pt. 1, at 2.
100. 107 CONG. REC. 19410 (1961) (emphasis added).
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appear to offer much support for the conclusion drawn by the court
in Marine Space Enclosures that such a hearing is required by the
language of section 15.101
IV
The legislative history of the 1961 amendments to section 15, in
addition to court precedents, does not seem to support the court's
conclusion in Marine Space Enclosures that a pre-approval hearing
is required by congressional mandate. In fact, it appears to prove
the contrary. Nevertheless, the legislative history is admittedly
somewhat unclear and confusing and could be considered
inconclusive.
The legislative history aside, however, it cannot be determined,
as a practical matter, that the court's conclusion is necessary. With
or without that conclusion the court and past Commission practice
reach much the same result. If it is assumed that no pre-approval
hearing is required, the Commission is, in every case, left with the
decision when to hold a hearing to meet the requirements of due
process. The Commission then would have the discretion to make
that decision, and an aggrieved party could seek redress in the courts
which might find an abuse of discretion in the Commission's failure
to hold a hearing202
If a pre-approval hearing is required, discretion is again left with
the Commission in every case. The Commission would determine
when to apply an exception to the hearing requirement, and again,
a court might then find an abuse of this exercise of discretion. In
either case it is the Commission which makes the initial
determination as to when a hearing is required, and it must be
assumed that the Commission will-as will any such body-act
within the law and abide by established precedent. With regard to
the FMC, from the statistics cited earlier and the history of the
Commission, at least since 1961, it can be fairly said that the
Commission has not exhibited any laxness in this area. The
Commission has acted under the assumption that matters of a
significantly restrictive nature and agreements apparently in
substantial violation of the anti-trust laws require the type of hearing
appropriate under the circumstances.1' °
101. 420 F.2d at 584.
102. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. IV, 1969).
103. See. e.g., Inter-American Freight Conference Agreements. 11 F.M.C. 332 (1967);
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In addition, the Commission has a well developed internal system
for processing proposed agreements which comports with that
outlined by the court. The court's system of exceptions is one with
which the Commission is already prepared to deal in a manner
consistent with statutory provisions and with the court's own
guidelines. The FMC is a quasi-judicial body established by
Congress primarily for protecting the public interest in our country's
foreign waterborne commerce. °4 The Commission therefore, must
always act in the public interest, whether that be through holding
hearings to analyze weighty issues or through expeditious treatment
of agreements to permit the commencement-or improvement of
shipping services. To accomplish these ends the Commission cannot
be tied down by needless formalities, but must make the statutes
under its jurisdiction workable through the judicious use of flexible
alternatives."'
Thus, while it is difficult to disagree with the court's decision to
remand the Marine Space Enclosures case, it is equally difficult to
agree with the route the court chose to reach its ultimate conclusion.
Furthermore, there are indications in the court's opinion that
regardless of the hearing requirements of section 15, the court
actually reached its decision primarily because the Commission
failed adequately to support its decision:1 6 "The discussion [in the
Commission's Order of Approval] is couched in conclusory terms
without any support of record. . . .These recitations [by the
Commission] are ample in rhetoric, but 'sparing in detail.' They are
without support in the record .... ,,1o7 It thus appears entirely
unnecessary for the court to have premised its decision on a pre-
approval hearing requirement.
Although the previous discussion is critical of the court's
conclusion that a pre-approval hearing is always required, there is
Merger-American Mail Line, American President Lines, Pacific Far East Line, 11 F.M.C.
53 (1967); Stock Purchase Agreement Between Prudential Lines and W.R. Grace & Co., FMC
Docket No. 69-51 (Dec. 22, 1969); Agreement No. 9827 Between United States Lines and
Sea-Land Service, Order for Investigation and Hearing, FMC Docket No. 69-56 (Nov. 25,
1969). See also Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC, 420 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
104. See Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961, § 103, 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15 note (1964).
105. See California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 584 (1943).
106. Cf., e.g., United States Atl. & Gulf/Australia-New Zealand Conference v. FMC, 364
F.2d 696, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
107. 420 F.2d at 587-88.
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
an aspect of the decision which offers a .very important aid to the
Commission, that is, the type of hearing to be held in cases which
so require. The court said that while section 15 requires a pre-
approval hearing, such hearing shall be an "appropriate" one;'08 the
court refrained from directing the Commission to hold an
"evidentiary" hearing.' Thus, what emerges from the court's
discussion of this point"0 is specific recognition of the need for the
FMC to tailor, in its discretion, the type of hearing which might be
required in a particular case.'
The requirement of a hearing . . may be satisfied by something less time-
consuming than courtroom drama.'
The requirement of an evidentiary hearing is not a mandate of a prolix
procedure protracted beyond. . . the requirements of the issues.'
While these hearing guidelines have general applicability in
administrative proceedings,"' it is particularly desirable and most
helpful to have such a clear statement of the permissible flexibility
of hearings which may be ordered by the Federal Maritime
Commission. The need for a hearing and the type of hearing to be
conducted are issues that have been problematical to the Federal
Maritime Commission for quite some time. Hopefully, the above
treatment of the questions will, in addition to exposing the issues to
some examination, be of help to those who must deal with the merits
of the issues on a practical day to day basis.
108. Id. at 584.
109. Id. at 590.
110. Id. at 589-90.
111. Id. at 589 n.36; American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
112. 420 F.2d at 589.
113. Id. at 590.
114. Id. at 589.
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